Contagious Authoritarianism and Democracy Backsliding: Cameroon as a Case in Point

Contagious Authoritarianism and Democracy Backsliding: Cameroon as a Case in Point

Lilian Lem Atanga
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa

Abstract

Across regions, research identifies a rising wave of contagious authoritarianism, the diffusion of illiberal norms, civic repression, and electoral manipulation through transnational networks of autocratic learning (Diamond, 2015; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). This trend is reshaping the architecture of global governance, eroding its normative foundations and exposing the fragility of the multi-centric global order that has evolved. In such a system, multiple state and non-state actors exercise influence, but without coherent mechanisms to enforce democratic standards or protect civic freedoms (Lake, Martin, & Risse, 2021).

Cameroon offers a compelling case in this shifting landscape. Although constitutionally a multiparty democracy, it has experienced consistent democratic backsliding marked by electoral manipulation, constrained opposition, and systematic human rights violations (Freedom House, 2024). Data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (2024) indicate that Cameroon’s Electoral Democracy Index stood at 0.298 in 2023, far below the global average of 0.498, reflecting entrenched authoritarian resilience. The ongoing Anglophone crisis further exemplifies the failures of both domestic governance and international engagement, where dialogue efforts have faltered, and global institutions have responded with caution rather than principled intervention (Amnesty International, 2023).

Cooley (2015) and Diamond (2021) note that authoritarian learning thrives when democratic actors collectively fail to defend norms. Drawing from Cameroon’s experience, this analysis contends that global governance must prioritize inclusive dialogue, citizen-centered accountability, and the protection of civic space as pillars of democratic resilience. Without such recalibration, the global order risks devolving into a patchwork of competing sovereignties, where authoritarianism not only survives but legitimizes itself under the guise of pluralism.

Introduction

The ongoing crisis in Cameroon, beginning with the Anglophone crisis of 2016, the presidential elections of 2018, the parliamentary elections of 2020, and, recently, the presidential elections of 2025, presents a compelling case study for examining the strengths and limits of contemporary global governance. The Anglophone conflict is in its tenth year. Post-election crises, including violence, non-appointment of a new government, constitutional change, and delayed naming of a vice president, have deepened political fractures across the country. Cameroon illustrates how localized grievances can escalate into protracted governance crises, where institutions fail to provide credible avenues for accountability, inclusion, and conflict resolution. The situation in Cameroon exposes the complex interplay between sovereignty, regional stability, and international responsibility at a time when the global order is increasingly characterized by fragmentation and normative contestation.

While the problems in Cameroon are often framed as a “domestic” political crisis, their dynamics are embedded in broader global governance debates: the shrinking space for preventive diplomacy, which places social detection and early intervention of violent conflict at the vanguard of international politics (Djibom 2006). There is an inconsistent application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), in which Bellamy (2009) argues that the R2P reframes sovereignty as a duty. He asserts that states must protect their populations from mass atrocities. He also notes that the international community has a responsibility to assist, or intervene if necessary, when states fail. R2P, on the other hand, places structural constraints that limit the capacity of regional organizations and multilateral bodies to act decisively. The conflict in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon, and the recent post-electoral violence, highlight the gap between global commitments to peace and human rights and the political realities that shape action within the AU, ECCAS, and the UN Security Council, where protection is needed, but strong international action is limited. Also, there is tokenism of feminist foreign policy and the inclusion of women in governance practices, where women play a vital role in conflict resolution, from local community dialogue, e.g., the South West North West Women’s Task Force – SNWOT, North West Women Mediators, to international negotiations and diplomacy (The Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiations- CDN), is not highlighted.

In the second half of 2025 and early 2026, Cameroon experienced increased deterioration in security and governance indicators: intensified clashes between state forces and armed separatist groups in the North West and South West Regions, increased civilian casualties, spreading through the French-speaking regions, deepening humanitarian needs, and heightened repression following the 2025 electoral process. This convergence of crises makes Cameroon not only a humanitarian emergency as highlighted by OCHA, but also a governance challenge, with implications that extend beyond national borders, affecting stability in the Gulf of Guinea, the Sahel Regions, transnational crime networks, refugee flows, local and trans-border human and arms trafficking, and the regional balance of power. With an increase in IED use in the English-speaking regions, the contested presidential elections, and a change in the constitution, spikes of violence have been exacerbated in the other 8 regions of the country, raising security challenges for the government, which is already grappling with the Anglophone conflict and Boko Haram and internal squabbles. Increased displacement with rising IDPs deepens the humanitarian crisis largely ignored by the state.

Against this backdrop, coupled with shrinking humanitarian funding, global governance mechanisms have struggled to provide effective coordination, early warning, or sustained engagement. Despite multiple reports from international NGOs and UN agencies, the Security Council has remained silent, constrained by geopolitical interests and the politics of non-interference, as it struggles with maintaining legitimacy within the sub-region. The UN, the European Union, and the African Union, together with other foreign governments (the United States, Great Britain, among others, issued statements relating to democracy but have not mounted any unified response, while bilateral partners prioritize trade diplomacy and immigration cooperation over human rights and inclusive governance. Statements and calls to action from international organizations and governments tend to have little impact on national governance practices (in Cameroon), limiting the power of the limits of quiet diplomacy, while highlighting the need for AU-EU-UN hybrid approaches, and where cyber governance tools have minimal power in shaping state response.

This paper then posits that Cameroon stands at the intersection of several governance failures: weak state legitimacy, fragmented regional diplomacy, competing international interests and priorities, and a global system increasingly unable to manage internal conflicts with cross-border consequences. Yet it also offers important lessons: the role of civil society in conflict zones, the potential of local peace infrastructures, and the opportunities for more flexible diplomatic instruments such as Aria-formula meetings, preventive engagement, and multi-stakeholder negotiations, and recently trade diplomacy as an instrument of governance.

To advance this argument, the paper presents a literature review mapping the field, theoretical frameworks used in the paper, a historical and structural analysis of Cameroon’s crisis, International and global responses, and why these global responses have failed.

In being self-reflexive, I practice and research within the context of discourse analysis, gender and politics, international diplomacy, and global governance. Current global politics prioritize economic or trade diplomacy over democracy and humanitarian and human rights governance, sustaining autocracy and failed civil protections. With this background, I find the need to examine democratic backsliding and contagious autocracy in Cameroon.

Ultimately, the Cameroonian crises (multipolar) challenge us to rethink how global governance addresses hybrid conflicts, those that are simultaneously political, identity-based, and transnational. It forces the international community to confront uncomfortable questions about selective engagement, the politics of silence, and the erosion of collective responsibility in an increasingly multipolar world. The lessons drawn from Cameroon are not only urgent but are also instructive for understanding the future of governance in fragile and politically contested environments.

2. Literature Review

This literature review situates Cameroon’s contemporary crisis within broader debates on authoritarian diffusion, democratic backsliding, global governance, and conflict resolution in Africa. It synthesizes global scholarly debates with Cameroonian literature and research by local academics and civil society, ensuring the analysis is grounded in lived realities.

2.1 Global Trends: Contagious Authoritarianism and Democratic Backsliding

Since the mid-2000s, global democracy indices have shown a steady decline in liberal democratic norms (Diamond, 2015; Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). Scholars describe this trend as autocratic learning, where regimes emulate each other’s strategies in digital surveillance, repression, constitutional manipulation, and state-sponsored disinformation (Cooley, 2015; Diamond, 2021). The Varieties of Democracy Report (V-Dem, 2024) shows that 71% of the world’s population now lives under autocratic rule, with Cameroon featuring in a very high index of autocracy.

I explore the exportation of authoritarian “best practices” through diplomatic and military networks, the weak enforcement of democratic norms by global institutions, and the rising geopolitical competition that undermines multilateral consensus. These global frameworks create the environment within which Cameroon’s authoritarian consolidation occurs. The contagion of authoritarianism, expressed first as personalized power heavily centered around an individual, is exemplified by Paul Biya, who has a personality cult and a political structure that utilizes state resources to promote/patronize individuals who support him. It is also expressed through electoral manipulation, in which the elections management body, ELECAM, is merely a de jure body, without the power to independently manage elections fairly and transparently. However, the rigging machinery, established and polished by the Biya regime, bypasses the electoral systems, utilizing governance structures such as divisional offices and the constitutional council peopled by nepotistic relations, while weaponizing poverty to rig the elections.

Contagious authoritarianism is a system where authoritarian attitudes, governance practices, or entire regimes spread across populations or borders, often triggered by social transmission or perceived crises. Cooper (2021:4) argues that elite factions in neoliberal heartlands have fallen prey to “authoritarian contagion,” driven by a lurch toward “authoritarian protectionism” and a response to the perceived failure of democratic institutions to manage modern crises. This can be explained through a choice of corruption and nepotism over transparency, accountability, and democracy.

Democracy and human rights are traded in a geopolitical race (arms and trade) between the United States, China, and Russia, competing for key (rare earth) minerals. Cameroon stands at a strategic intersection between this old world (France and Western governments who influence the birth and ‘growth’ of what it mostly is today) and a growing Russia and China bloc offering strategic partnerships required for strengthening its autocracy. In a 2024 comparative study, Amtenbrink (2024) posits that the engagement of China and Russia (in Cameroon and) across Africa is a distinct form of neo-colonialism, using economic, political, and military strategies for their own benefit, where neo-colonialism can be seen as a global governance system from the ‘north’. In his doctoral dissertation, Essiene (2023) highlights the inaction of China and Russia, particularly within the UN Security Council, and their claim of non-interference in a sovereign country, and, in the case of Cameroon, giving power to an already authoritarian government to continue its rule with impunity.

2.2 African Governance and Regional Diplomacy

African scholarship emphasizes that democratic backsliding in the region is often tied to personalist presidential systems (Cheeseman & Fisher, 2019), securitized governance models (Efebeh, 2021), weak independence of electoral institutions, and ambiguous enforcement of AU norms. The AU’s instruments, such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, have limited teeth, especially when dealing with entrenched incumbents like Paul Biya. Regional bodies such as ECCAS historically prioritize stability over democratic legitimacy (Engel, 2019), a pattern visible in the muted response to Cameroon’s Anglophone conflict since 2016.

2.3 Cameroon-Specific Literature

Literature abounds on the analyses of Cameroon’s governance challenges, including Konings & Nyamnjoh (2019) tracing the historical marginalization of Anglophone regions since the 1961 federal arrangement was dismantled, Nkwi (2020) documenting the escalation of grievances into an armed conflict and state repression, and failures of decentralization by Chem-Langhée & Funteh (2018). Ayim (2021) analyzes violent extremism, cycles of retaliation, and civilian suffering, while Takoué (2017) examines the centralization of power in the presidency. Tapang (2023) claims that elections and democracy in Cameroon are used as tools for authoritarianism, as politicians manipulate elections and militarize politics (see Chereji, 2020).

Women have been at the center of peacebuilding in Cameroon, especially in the English-speaking regions. In 1990, the Takumbeng-led resistance movements (Atanga, 2010) emerged against military brutality during the quest for multi-party politics in Cameroon. Recently, during the Armed Conflict in Cameroon, Women’s coalitions like SNWOT (South West North West Women’s Taskforce) and Women-led organizations like the CDN (Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiations) were very central in peaceful resistance and negotiations for Dialogue between separatist and government forces. While SNWOT worked at the national level, the CDN was engaged in multistakeholder negotiations (Begealawuh 2025; Annan et al. 2021). A combined force of local and diasporic women and women-led organizations, resulting from migrated ideologies and policy and diplomatic engagements, constrained the government of Cameroon to organize the Major National Dialogue or engage in the Canada Talks (Atanga 2023).

3. Theoretical Framework

This section outlines the analytical tools used to interpret Cameroon’s crisis. We use a Multi-Centric Global Governance Model, which draws on Lake, Martin, and Risse (2021). Global governance today consists of overlapping state and non-state actors, without clear hierarchies or enforcement mechanisms. The model helps explain why global responses to Cameroon are inconsistent, how geopolitical interests override normative commitments, and why Cameroon can “forum shop” between partners (China, France, Russia, Turkey, etc.).

We also examine democratic Backsliding and Authoritarian Learning. Democratic backsliding literature focuses on the gradual erosion of institutions rather than outright coups. This tends to be a more subtle approach that keeps autocrats in power for long periods of time. Cameroon’s case illustrates a weakening judiciary, shrinking civic space, manipulation of electoral laws, securitization of political dissent, and digital authoritarianism (internet shutdowns in 2017, 2020, 2025). The concept of authoritarian learning explains how Cameroon has imported and adopted tactics that are circulating globally.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2013; Van Dijk, 2008; Atanga, 2010) is used to examine how power and ideology shape political narratives surrounding “national unity” vs. “separatism”, “terrorism” labels applied to Anglophone activists, state justifications for military action, humanitarian reports as “foreign interference”, and Gendered Narratives Marginalizing Women Peacebuilders. CDA enables us to analyze how language reproduces power in Cameroon’s governance discourse. Labels of ‘terrorism’ (Begealawuh 2024) are used as a political tool intended to silence legitimate dissent. He argues that journalists and media organizations providing alternative or critical political discourse, including giving airtime to actors in the Anglophone crisis, face harassment, intimidation, and prosecution under broadly framed counter-terrorism laws. (Talla 2024) examines how the territorial administration minister uses discourse to terrorize civilians, and recently, in 2025, he indicated he would use Moulinex (a brand name of a blender) to grind the enemies of the state. Such language is indicative of the curbing of freedom of speech and the shrinking of civic spaces in Cameroon.

4. Historical and Structural Analysis of Cameroon’s Crisis

4.1 Roots of the Anglophone Problem

Cameroon’s contemporary conflicts are rooted in the post-colonial settlements of 1961, which created a federal state uniting British Southern Cameroons with French Cameroon. The dissolution of federalism in 1972 marked a decisive shift toward centralized, Francophone-dominated governance, generating longstanding grievances over language, legal systems, education, and political representation.

Peaceful protests by lawyers and teachers in 2016 sought redress within constitutional frameworks. The state’s militarized response transformed these grievances into a broader separatist movement, illustrating how repression accelerates radicalization rather than restoring order.

4.2 Escalation into Armed Conflict

By 2017, the crisis had escalated into full-scale armed conflict. According to humanitarian sources, over 6,000 people have been killed, more than 750,000 internally displaced, and dozens of villages destroyed (CHRDA, 2024; OCHA, 2024). Armed groups fragmented over time, while civilians bore the brunt of violence from both state and non-state actors.

4.3 Post-Electoral Dynamics (2018–2025)

Paul Biya took over power not through elections from President Ahidjo in a one-party system. Since 1992, following the establishment of a multi-party system, there have been no free, fair, and transparent elections. Fru claimed victory in the 1990s and, recently, in 2018, Maurice Kamto, and in 2025, Issa Tchiroma Bakari. The contested 2018 presidential election, the boycotted 2020 regional elections, and the heavily securitized 2025 presidential elections further entrenched authoritarian governance. Digital shutdowns, mass arrests, and militarized polling environments illustrate how elections have become sites of control rather than participation.

The government of Cameroon spends millions of dollars on ‘security’ to repress protesters. After every election in Cameroon, the government imprisons opposition leaders and their supporters, such as Kamto in 2018, Anicet Ekane, and Djeukam Tchameni in 2025. Anicet Ekani died in prison, and the key opposition leader, Issa Tchiroma Bakari, is on the run, in exile. Using the country’s armed forces, hundreds are killed, and thousands are in prison. This precedent is part of a system that entrenches authoritarianism. Rigging elections and using force to maintain peace then becomes a playbook.

A 2026 constitutional change to include the post of vice president has resulted in a stalemate over who becomes a vice president. Given the politicized nature of the position and its framing as someone who replaces the president for the rest of the term in the event of an emergency, and given the president’s age, the demand for the position becomes very high. The delay in the naming of a government and the appointment of the vice president speaks to governance challenges of the Biya government.

5. Global Governance and International Responses

Cameroon’s protracted crisis has elicited sustained attention from humanitarian actors, civil society organizations, and select diplomatic circles. Yet this attention has not translated into a coherent or decisive global governance response. Instead, international engagement has been characterized by fragmentation, caution, and an overarching reluctance to confront entrenched power. Examining the responses of multilateral institutions, regional bodies, bilateral partners, and non-state actors reveals the structural and political limits of a multi-centric global governance system operating under conditions of authoritarian resurgence, and highlights an interest-based international engagement with the government of Cameroon, prioritizing stability over good governance and democratic change.

5.1 The United Nations System

The United Nations has played a paradoxical role in Cameroon. On the one hand, UN agencies, including OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, and OHCHR, have produced extensive documentation of humanitarian needs, displacement, and human rights violations. These reports provide credible evidence of civilian harm, patterns of abuse, and the deterioration of civic space. On the other hand, this evidentiary base has not translated into political action at the level of the UN Security Council (UNSC). UNSC has prioritized silence over engagement on the case of Cameroon, with a dominant discourse of non-interference.

The UN functions as a civil service, helping governments run and avoiding being confrontational. Because its core team is appointed by governments and answerable to these governments, it avoids actions that would cause governments to expel it from their country, or cut cooperation ties, and thus moves carefully in politically sensitive contexts, while often prioritizing process, dialogue, and stability over public confrontation. The government of Cameroon has threatened to expel United Nations bodies severely, especially over the Anglophone crisis, and often censors reports on Cameroon (albeit covertly) to eliminate data showing its gross violations of human rights.

As such, the UNSC has remained largely silent on Cameroon, despite repeated appeals by civil society and some member states. Civil Society groups, including the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiations (CDN) and South West North West Women’s Taskforce (SNWOT), have appealed to the UNSC, which systematically stays silent and proffers the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of a nation. This silence reflects broader dynamics of veto politics, geopolitical trade-offs, and the prioritization of counter-terrorism and regional stability over human rights accountability. Cameroon’s role in regional security, particularly in the fight against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, has insulated it from scrutiny, as powerful states are reluctant to jeopardize military cooperation. Also, because Cameroon practices the politics of diplomatic restraint and avoids antagonizing powerful or neighboring states, it positions itself as a “stable” and predictable diplomatic actor. The risks of such a strategy are that it shields authoritarian practices from scrutiny, justifies silence on human rights abuses, and enables mutual protection among regimes. This silence has been seen to legitimize sham elections, torture, the deprivation of freedom of speech, and (masked) mass killings in the anglophone conflict, and Biya as the de jure president of Cameroon, after a highly contested presidential election.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), often invoked in cases of mass atrocity risk, has similarly failed to gain traction. While Cameroon has not reached the threshold of genocide or crimes against humanity as formally defined, the persistent pattern of civilian targeting, forced displacement, and collective punishment raises serious concerns about atrocity prevention. Yet the absence of political consensus has rendered R2P largely symbolic in this context.

This dynamic illustrates a central weakness of multi-centric global governance: normative frameworks exist, but their activation depends on political will that is increasingly absent. The UN system, fragmented across humanitarian, human rights, and political pillars, lacks mechanisms to compel unified action when major powers are disinclined to lead.

5.2 The African Union and ECCAS

The African Union, perceived by many Africans as a lame body when it comes to governance within the continent, occupies an ambivalent position in Cameroon’s crisis. With many old and autocratic leaders spanning several terms of office amidst fraudulent elections, the AU has struggled to translate the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG) into action when confronted with entrenched incumbents like Paul Biya. The AU’s engagement has been largely limited to rhetorical appeals for dialogue and stability without pursuing any sustained action towards mediation of the different conflicts plaguing Cameroon, from the Anglophone conflict to post-election violence. This reluctance reflects a broader pattern within the AU, where respect for sovereignty and non-interference often outweighs the enforcement of democratic norms, particularly when influential member states are involved.

ECCAS, on the other hand, has historically prioritized regime stability and security cooperation over democratic accountability. Cameroon, as the economic powerhouse of ECCAS, has contributed to the organization’s muted response, as member states are wary of setting precedents that could later be applied to their own governance practices. As a result, regional diplomacy has reinforced, rather than challenged, authoritarian consolidation. Authoritarianism here becomes contagious.

The AU and ECCAS responses thus reveal a structural contradiction: regional institutions tasked with safeguarding democratic norms are simultaneously constrained by the political interests of their member states. This contradiction undermines the credibility of African multilateralism and limits its capacity to act as a counterweight to authoritarian diffusion, rather than entrenching it and setting a precedent for other countries.

5.3 Bilateral Actors and Strategic Partnerships

Bilateral engagement with Cameroon reflects the broader shift toward realpolitik in international relations. France, Cameroon’s former colonial power, has maintained close security and economic ties, framing its engagement primarily through the lens of counter-terrorism and regional stability. While French officials have occasionally expressed concern about human rights, these statements have rarely been accompanied by policy shifts or conditionality.

China’s engagement follows a doctrine of non-interference, emphasizing infrastructure development, trade, and diplomatic support without governance conditions. This approach provides the Cameroonian government with alternative sources of legitimacy and material support, reducing its vulnerability to Western pressure. Russia, though less economically embedded, has expanded its influence through security cooperation and diplomatic backing within multilateral forums.

The United States and the United Kingdom have adopted a more critical tone, including targeted sanctions and parliamentary debates. However, these measures remain limited in scope and have not fundamentally altered governance dynamics. The absence of coordinated bilateral pressure allows Cameroon to navigate between partners, extracting benefits while avoiding substantive reform.

This approach reduces bilateral partners to empty statements without any matching action or sanctions, coming across as the backing of a toothless bulldog. The government of Cameroon, in a 2025 statement after the presidential elections, warned bilateral and multilateral partners not to meddle in its internal affairs. This was enough to shut up these partners and reduce their actions to mere statements without any mechanisms to enforce sanctions, more interested in maintaining bilateral relations.

This pattern underscores how geopolitical competition weakens normative enforcement. In a multi-centric system, states with strategic value can leverage rivalries among external actors to insulate themselves from accountability. States prefer ‘open communication channels’ to being sidelined if they were to call out the Biya Government.

5.4 Civil Society, Diaspora, and Track-Two Diplomacy

In contrast to official diplomacy, civil society and diaspora actors have played a critical role in sustaining dialogue and advocacy around Cameroon. Women-led initiatives such as the South West North West Women’s Task Force (SNWOT) and the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiations (CDN), and human rights organizations like Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA), and Humanitarian organizations like Reach Out Cameroon, have engaged in community mediation, transnational advocacy, and informal negotiations aimed at de-escalation.

Diaspora mobilization has amplified international awareness, particularly in Europe and North America, through protests, lobbying, and engagement with lawmakers and policy organizations. Faith leaders and traditional authorities have also contributed to local peace infrastructures, often operating in spaces inaccessible to formal institutions. A Diaspora-led leadership retreat of Cameroonian Stakeholders – religious leaders, political leaders, women leaders, separatist groups met in Toronto, Canada, organized by the CDN, pushed the government of Cameroon, for example, to start negotiation talks with Anglophone separatists in 2021. The government of Canada led these talks, and the government of Cameroon later reneged on them. Canada was left in the cold and unable to move forward, with fear of harming its bilateral relations with Cameroon. Civil society organizations eventually got frustrated as track-two diplomacy faces significant constraints. The CDN and Project C, both diaspora organizations, continue to influence how diasporas engage with citizens and social and political outcomes. Lack of formal recognition, limited resources, and political resistance from the state restrict its impact. Moreover, without alignment with track-one processes, informal dialogue risks being marginalized or instrumentalized, without producing structural change.

6. Why Global Governance Has Failed Cameroon

The failure of global governance in Cameroon cannot be attributed to a single institution or actor. Rather, it emerges from the interaction of political, institutional, and normative constraints that collectively undermine collective action.

At the political level, major powers are reluctant to destabilize an ally, even when governance practices erode democratic norms and fuel conflict. Economic diplomacy becomes more important than democracy and human rights. Additionally, global fatigue with “protracted African crises” has contributed to disengagement. Cameroon is often framed as an internal conflict lacking international spillover, despite clear regional implications. This framing enables selective attention and justifies inaction. The framing of the resolution of the crises in Cameroon tends to rest on an after-Biya era, as whispered in diplomatic corridors. Political fatigue, both internal and international, becomes very evident here.

Institutionally, global governance bodies suffer from fragmentation and limited enforcement capacity. The UN’s division between humanitarian, human rights, and political mandates prevents integrated responses. The AU and ECCAS lack coercive tools and depend on consensus among member states, many of which face similar governance challenges. The fear of states to challenge a government when it is guilty of the same issues. This institutional weakness allows states like Cameroon to selectively engage institutions that offer support while avoiding those that demand accountability.

Normatively, sovereignty remains a powerful shield against external intervention. The Cameroonian government has consistently framed the Anglophone crisis as a matter of national unity and counter-terrorism, delegitimizing dissent and external critique. International actors, wary of accusations of neo-colonialism or interference, often defer to this framing. This same argument was used during the 2025 post-election violence when the government of Cameroon responded to the European Union, which noted it was ‘deeply concerned’ and called for ‘calls on the authorities of Cameroon for accountability, transparency and justice to tackle instances of excessive use of violence and human rights violations. It also calls for the release of all those arbitrarily detained since the presidential elections. In response, the government of Cameroon demanded that the EU stop meddling with the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

Gendered exclusion further weakens normative frameworks. Despite women’s central role in humanitarian efforts and peacebuilding, they remain marginal in formal negotiations, reinforcing exclusionary governance patterns and limiting the sustainability of peace efforts. Women’s movements carry grassroots voices of the most affected in conflict situations and suffer the consequences of bad governance, often being the most socio-economically vulnerable. During the Anglophone conflict, about 70% of internally displaced people (IPDs) and refugees are women and children. This group of people is minimally consulted in all efforts at dialogue and negotiations in Cameroon, starting from the Grand National Dialogue, the failed Canada Talks, and other national deliberations.

7. Recalibrating Global Governance Through Cameroon

The failure of global governance in Cameroon is not inevitable. Rather, it reflects choices, political, institutional, and normative, that can be revisited and reoriented. Drawing on the analysis above, this section makes suggestions for strengthening democratic resilience, protecting civic space, and supporting inclusive political transitions within a multi-centric global governance system. These recommendations are deliberately framed as practical, incremental, and politically grounded, recognizing both the constraints and possibilities of contemporary diplomacy.

The UN Security Council remains a critical, if underutilized, arena for preventive diplomacy. While consensus on formal resolutions may be difficult (China and Russia always insist on State sovereignty, France protecting its interests in Cameroon, and the United States not wanting to antagonize France), several tools remain available.

1. The Arria-formula meeting on Cameroon in 2019 provided space for civil society, women peacebuilders, humanitarian actors, and regional experts to brief Council members informally. This meeting pressured the government of Cameroon to organize the Grand National Dialogue in 2019. This meeting can be leveraged again, hoping its outcome pressures the government of Cameroon to engage in fair and frank discussions on socio-political issues plaguing Cameroon, as they have proven effective in elevating issues blocked from the formal agenda and can generate political momentum without unanimity in the Council.
2. Special Envoys or Special Advisors engage in quiet diplomacy with national authorities, opposition actors, regional organizations, and civil society. Even without enforcement powers, the presence of a high-level envoy signals international attention and can help coordinate fragmented UN engagement. Cameroon could benefit from having one.

As Cameroon faces two core issues, the anglophone conflict and political violence, two demands of the citizens stand out: for the anglophones, there is a request for a free, fair, frank, and inclusive dialogue to address the root causes of the conflict, and the release of its political prisoners – ‘prisoners of conscience’, and demilitarize the two regions. The government has not been able to end the conflict militarily, and thus mediation and dialogue remain the only viable option.

At a greater national level, there is urgent demand for electoral reforms. The electoral system, over the past decades, has been made to serve the incumbent, further entrenching authoritarianism and democracy backsliding.

Meanwhile, the civil society in Cameroon continues to be weakened by the state, with shrinking civic spaces. There is a need for bigger civil society coalitions, working with diasporic organizations and movements to help counter the authoritarian regime.

8. Conclusion: Cameroon and the Future of Global Governance

Cameroon’s crisis reveals the fragility of a multi-centric global governance system when normative commitments are not matched by political will. The country exemplifies how contagious authoritarianism thrives within fragmented institutions, selective diplomacy, and a global shift toward realpolitik. Silence, caution, and inconsistency, rather than overt hostility to democracy, have enabled authoritarian resilience.

Yet Cameroon also offers important lessons. Civil society resilience, diasporic engagements, women-led peacebuilding, and local dialogue initiatives demonstrate that alternative pathways exist, even in highly securitized environments. These efforts challenge the assumption that stability requires repression and underscore the importance of inclusive, citizen-centered governance.

For global governance to remain sustainable, it must be reclaimed from geopolitical paralysis by prioritizing preventive and inclusive dialogue, strengthening early-warning and mediation mechanisms, amplifying women’s leadership, and restoring normative legitimacy to multilateral action. The question facing the international community is not whether it has the tools to act, but whether it has the resolve to use them.

References